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n the March 2010 issue of the Journal of Economic
Literature, Alan Blinder of Princeton University con-
siders the structure of the Federal Reserve, discussing
its regulatory powers and decisionmaking institutions. I
welcome Professor Blinder’s thoughtful contribution to
this issue, even if I must disagree with some of his views.
Specifi  cally, I believe that Professor Blinder omitted some
important facts when discussing the structure of the Federal
Reserve District banks:
The twelve district banks are, technically, private corpora-
tions with shareholders and boards of directors.* As share-
holders, bankers comprise three of the nine members of
each Reserve Bank board; and none of the nine are politi-
cal appointees. Each of these boards, in turn, essentially
selects the president of its bank, who sits on the FOMC as
a national policymaker.** This is a highly unusual way to
select policymakers, to say the least…Yet, unlike Fed gover-
nors, none of the Reserve Bank presidents have the demo-
cratic legitimacy that is conferred by political appointment.
(Blinder, 2010, p. 127)
To characterize the regional Reserve Banks as “private
corporations”—although technically true—is misleading
because the Reserve Banks do not exist to profit their share-
holders but to serve the public interest. The Federal Reserve
Act created the decentralized Federal Reserve structure
that Congress intended to balance the needs of the public—
including financial, agrarian, and industrial concerns. The
financial institutions that are “shareholders” (member banks)
may not sell or trade their Reserve Bank stock, whose divi-
dend and price are fixed by law. The member banks do
elect six of the nine members of each Reserve Bank’s board
of directors but do not retain Reserve Bank profits. The
Reserve Banks transfer their annual net earnings to the
U.S. Treasury.
Moreover, the presidentially appointed Board of
Governors exercises considerable control over the Reserve
Banks. The Board of Governors appoints three of the nine
members of each Bank’s board of directors. While each
board identifies candidates for the position of its Reserve
Bank president, the Board of Governors interviews candi-
dates as well; the successful candidate must obtain approval
from both the Board of Governors and the Reserve Bank
board of directors. So political appointees play a key role
in selecting Fed presidents. In addition, under its supervi-
sory authority, the Board requires each Reserve Bank to
submit an annual budget for approval, including the salaries
of senior Bank officers.
Because of their local ties, the Reserve Bank presidents
provide a diverse mix of views on regional trends, monetary
policy, and regulatory policy to the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC). For example, Darryl Francis, president
of the St. Louis Fed from 1966 to 1976, was a lonely voice
on the FOMC warning that monetary policy is the primary
force affecting inflation outcomes (see Poole, 2002). More
recently, William Poole, president of the St. Louis Fed from
1998 to 2008, presciently warned of the dangers to financial
stability created by the housing GSEs, long before the recent
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* A revealing curiosity: Each Federal Reserve Bank is a “dot.org,” while only the
Board of Governors in Washington is a “dot.gov.”
** Their selections must be approved by the Board of Governors, which virtually
always does so. As with private corporations, however, Reserve Bank presidents
play huge roles in selecting their own boards.housing crisis (Poole, 2003, 2005). And Gary Stern, president
of the Minneapolis Fed from 1985 to 2009, wrote a book
about the “too big to fail” problem in 2004, four years before
the big bank problems of 2008 (Stern and Feldman, 2004).
In practice, the structure of the Federal Reserve System
has served our country very well for many years: It ensures
that the Reserve Bank presidents are fully accountable to
our democratic institutions while providing a decentralized
structure that promotes healthy debate on monetary policy
and regulatory issues. ■
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